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 The United States Constitution provides that the President has 
the power to appoint federal judges with the advice and consent of 
the Senate.1 The Constitution does not specify the criteria that the 
President should use in selecting judicial nominees or that the Sen-
ate should employ in reviewing them. In recent years, the process of 
nominating and confirming candidates for the federal bench, and es-
pecially the Supreme Court, has become increasingly political and 
contentious. Professors Choi and Gulati criticize the apparently 
growing role ideology plays in choosing and evaluating judicial nomi-
nees and propose a bold alternative.2 Their “Tournament of Judges” 
purportedly consists of a series of ideologically neutral measures that 
identify which appellate judges “merit” elevation to the Supreme 
Court.3 By restricting the choice of a nominee to the winner of the 
tournament, Professors Choi and Gulati hope to eliminate the role of 
ideology and the attendant partisan battling from the selection of 
Supreme Court Justices. Moreover, they claim that their market-
based system for judicial selection would improve the quality of 
nominees.4 The current federal appellate bench, which is itself a 
product of the very system that Professors Choi and Gulati lament, 
should perhaps be grateful for their providing the equivalent of an 
HR manual for boosting each judge’s odds of promotion.5 But we are 
                                                                                                                     
 * Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 
 ** Olin Fellow in Law and Economics, The University of Chicago Law School. Miles 
is formerly a law clerk to Judge Bybee. The opinions expressed are solely those of the au-
thors. 
 1. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 2. See Stephen Choi & Mitu Gulati, A Tournament of Judges?, 92 CAL. L. REV. 299, 
299 (2004) [hereinafter Choi & Gulati, Tournament]; Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, 
Choosing the Next Supreme Court Justice: An Empirical Ranking of Judge Performance, 78 
S. CAL. L. REV. 23 (2004) [hereinafter Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking].  
 3. See Choi & Gulati, Tournament, supra note 2, at 301-02. 
 4. See id.; Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking, supra note 2. 
 5. Whether any judge should want to seek appointment to the Court is beyond 
Choi and Gulati’s study and our comments. Judge Frank Easterbrook has recently 
commented that “any judge who claims not to fancy a position on that Court is a 
liar.” Howard Bashman, 20 Questions for Circuit Judge Frank H. Easterbrook of 
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convinced that evaluating judicial performance is not as easy as they 
suppose and that relying exclusively on the Tournament to select a 
Supreme Court nominee would not advance the rule of law. 
 As a preliminary comment, we applaud Professors Choi and Gu-
lati for the purposes for which they undertake their study. Improving 
the quality of public discourse on the composition of the judiciary and 
increasing public awareness of the judiciary’s work and how it func-
tions are laudable goals.6 Moreover, empirical measurements, par-
ticularly empirical comparisons of a nominee to her judicial peers, 
can play an important role in informing decisionmakers and the pub-
lic on the relative merit of a nominee. We disagree, however, that 
empirical measurements should be the sole basis on which a nominee 
should be chosen.7 In the end, the real mettle of a potential nominee 
to the Court lies in her opinions and character. Reading opinions 
(much less discerning character), however, is time-consuming and, 
hence, costly. It is, moreover, an inexact science. For members of the 
public without legal training, comprehending the often complex legal 
analysis of a judicial opinion is prohibitive. The public has turned in-
stead to a less costly means of evaluating judicial nominees—looking 
at a nominee’s positions on what Professors Choi and Gulati call the 
“hot button issues,” such as abortion, gun rights, affirmative action, 
and capital punishment, among others.8 Professors Choi and Gulati 
decry the hot-button approach as unduly narrowing the range of le-
gal issues discussed and reducing the confirmation process “to quib-
bling over [a nominee’s] expected position on issues like affirmative 
action and abortion.”9 They propose supplanting, not merely supple-
menting, the current nomination and confirmation process with their 
system of rankings.10 Their rhetorically charged use of the word 
“tournament” implies that the highest-ranked judge has won or 
earned a position on the Court and that the President and Senate 
should be reduced to the ministerial roles of simply awarding the 
tournament winner her rightful place on the Court.  
 An evaluation of whether the current nomination and confirma-
tion system should be replaced with Choi and Gulati’s tournament 
scheme requires comparing the costs and benefits of each and deter-
mining which offers society the greatest benefits net of costs. Natu-
                                                                                                                     
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, HOW APPEALING (Aug. 2, 2004), 
at http://www.legalaffairs.org/howappealing/20q/2004_08_01_20q-appellateblog_archive.html. We 
cannot vouch for Judge Easterbrook’s view, but for purposes of our discussion, we will as-
sume that whether or not any particular judge aspires to the Supreme Court, a rational 
judge aspires to be qualified for the Court. 
 6. See Choi & Gulati, Tournament, supra note 2, at 302-04. 
 7. See Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking, supra note 2, at 35-36. 
 8. See id. at 24, 34, 39. 
 9. Id. at 33. 
 10. See id. at 35-36. 
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rally, as advocates of the tournament, Professors Choi and Gulati 
lament the shortcomings of the current hot-button system because it 
fails to distinguish arguments about a nominee’s merit from argu-
ments about the nominee’s ideology.11 A politician’s advocacy of, or 
opposition to, a particular nominee for purely “political” reasons ap-
pears unseemly, and politicians consequently attempt to mask their 
ideological arguments as arguments on the merits.12 Implicit in Pro-
fessor Choi and Gulati’s justification for their tournament is that 
politicians have become so successful at conflating ideology and merit 
that the public can no longer distinguish the two.13 The current sena-
torial stalemate on many appellate nominees, which many view as a 
dress rehearsal for a confrontation over a Supreme Court nominee, is 
presumably one consequence. 
 In this Essay, we describe several potential shortcomings of using 
the tournament to select judicial nominees. Before we turn attention 
to these potential costs, some benefits of the hot-button approach are 
worth noting. First, hot-button issues are politically charged because 
they matter to the public. Other issues about which the public should 
be concerned—but is not—certainly exist. The public’s failure to rec-
ognize the import of these other issues is a shortcoming of political 
discourse generally and is not specific to judicial confirmations; ar-
guments over economic, domestic, and foreign policies are full of nu-
ance and yet are frequently reduced to sloganeering and sound bites. 
Second, these issues may be hot buttons partly because they do have 
some power to predict a nominee’s positions on other, more obscure 
legal issues. Third, if a Supreme Court nominee has written an ap-
pellate opinion on the hot-button issue, the opinion should prove 
highly informative of the nominee’s abilities. When a judge confronts 
a case raising a hot-button issue, she knows that the public (and in 
the event of a nomination to the Supreme Court, the White House 
and Senate) will scrutinize the opinion, and she faces a strong incen-
tive to put forth her best possible efforts. An appellate opinion on a 
hot-button issue should therefore represent the author’s best judicial 
efforts and provide significant insights into her abilities as a legal 
analyst and stylist. In effect, each hot-button issue may constitute its 
own tournament of judges, the equivalent of a law review writing 
competition for judges.  
 The emphasis of this Essay is not that the current system lacks 
room for improvement—few would argue that it does not need im-
provement—but that the brave, new world of Supreme Court nomi-
nations proposed by Professors Choi and Gulati may not be as clearly 
                                                                                                                     
 11. Id. at 34-36. 
 12. Choi & Gulati, Tournament, supra note 2, at 301.  
 13. See Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking, supra note 2, at 27-28, 38. 
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superior to the current system as they suppose. In this Essay, we 
discuss three concerns with using the Tournament of Judges as a ba-
sis for selecting a nominee to the Supreme Court. First, like other 
contributors to this Symposium, we question whether the metrics 
proposed by Professors Choi and Gulati appropriately measure the 
performance of circuit judges. Second, even if the Choi/Gulati metrics 
accurately capture judicial performance, the tournament itself may 
create incentives that distort judicial behavior and erode the quality 
of appellate judging. The criteria and the method by which a judge 
may improve her standing are readily known, and thus we are con-
cerned that reducing judging to finite, measurable results would en-
courage judges to promote tournament criteria rather than adjudi-
cate individual cases: judges may “judge to the test.” Third, even if 
the Choi/Gulati metric accurately measures the performance of cir-
cuit judges, winning the tournament may not predict success as a 
Supreme Court Justice.  
I.   HOW ACCURATE ARE THE CHOI/GULATI MEASURES? 
A.   Productivity 
 Professors Choi and Gulati measure judicial performance along 
three dimensions: (1) productivity, (2) quality, and (3) independ-
ence.14 For productivity, they tally the number of opinions each judge 
published, because they assume that unpublished opinions “often in-
volve minimal effort (and a lower quality of reasoning).”15 However, 
norms about when a case warrants an opinion differ across circuits. 
Professors Choi and Gulati correct for these differing norms by add-
ing to each judge’s tally the difference between the average number 
of opinions published in the judge’s circuit and the average published 
in the most productive circuit, which, currently, is the Seventh Cir-
cuit.16 The appeal of this measure is that a judge who resolves more 
cases in published opinions appears hardworking, and it may often 
be the case. However, the measure is not without difficulties. 
 First, Professors Choi and Gulati’s assumption that unpublished 
opinions involve a lower quality of reasoning is dubious. In the Ninth 
Circuit, the test for whether to publish a decision is whether existing 
precedent squarely controls the issues presented.17 A judge’s failure 
                                                                                                                     
 14. Id. at 42. 
 15. Id. at 43. 
 16. Id. at 45. 
 17. See 9TH CIR. GEN. ORDERS 4.3.a (“A memorandum disposition cannot be cited as 
precedent. Unlike an opinion for publication which is designed to clarify the law of the cir-
cuit, a memorandum disposition is designed only to provide the parties and the district 
court with a concise explanation of this court’s decision. Because the parties and the dis-
trict court are aware of the facts, procedural events and applicable law underlying the dis-
pute, the disposition need recite only such information crucial to the result.”); see also 9TH 
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to see novel issues in a case may indicate deficiencies in the judge’s 
intellectual curiosity and legal acumen, or it may reflect the judge’s 
respect for existing precedent. Cases vary in the novelty of the legal 
questions they present and, hence, in the degree of guidance the par-
ties and future litigants require. As the Ninth Circuit rules indicate, 
cases that lack novelty should not be published because they offer 
current and future parties little or no instruction beyond existing 
precedent. In addition, judicial resources are constrained, at the very 
least, by the judge’s time. The opportunity cost of the time that a 
judge spends preparing a full opinion on a case furnishing little in-
struction to the public is the time that she could spend on another 
case presenting unresolved questions of law. Professors Choi and Gu-
lati implicitly assume that all cases offer the same amount of instruc-
tion and the same amount of social benefit because they believe that 
all cases deserve published opinions. In their tournament, this as-
sumption becomes an incentive to maximize publication. If pursued, 
this objective would work a substantial reallocation of judicial labor 
to less pressing questions.18 The tournament encourages a substitu-
tion that would decrease rather than increase the amount of social 
benefit that the appellate courts provide.  
 Second, Choi and Gulati’s focus on published opinions is not de-
void of ideological content. It disfavors advocates of judicial restraint 
who may prefer fewer published pronouncements from the bench. A 
recent study argues that the ideological leaning of a three-judge 
panel correlates with the decision to publish.19 The very purpose of 
                                                                                                                     
CIR. R. 36-2 (“A written, reasoned disposition shall be designated as an OPINION only if it: 
(a) Establishes, alters, modifies or clarifies a rule of law, or (b) Calls attention to a rule of 
law which appears to have been generally overlooked, or (c) Criticizes existing law, or (d) 
Involves a legal or factual issue of unique interest or substantial public importance, or (e) 
Is a disposition of a case in which there is a published opinion by a lower court or adminis-
trative agency, unless the panel determines that publication is unnecessary for clarifying 
the panel’s disposition of the case, or (f) Is a disposition of a case following a reversal or 
remand by the United States Supreme Court, or (g) Is accompanied by a separate concur-
ring or dissenting expression, and the author of such separate expression requests publica-
tion of the disposition of the Court and the separate expression.”). 
 18. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 168-69 
(1996) (“Given the workload of the federal courts of appeals today, the realistic choice is 
not between limited publication, on the one hand, and, on the other, improving and then 
publishing all the opinions that are not published today; it is between preparing but not 
publishing opinions in many cases and preparing no opinions in those cases.”); Hart v. 
Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1177 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[F]ew, if any, appellate courts have the 
resources to write precedential opinions in every case that comes before them.”); id. at 
1179 (“Adding endlessly to the body of precedent . . . can lead to confusion and unnecessary 
conflict.”). 
 19. See David S. Law, Strategic Judicial Lawmaking: Ideology, Publication, and Asy-
lum Law in the Ninth Circuit, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 817 (2005) (arguing that an examination 
of only published opinions leads to the erroneous conclusion that panels dominated by 
judges appointed by Republican Presidents were as likely to rule in favor of asylum seek-
ers as panels dominated by judges appointed by Democratic Presidents). 
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the tournament is to develop a measure of judicial merit free of ideol-
ogy, but by examining only published opinions, the tournament re-
tains ideological content. It favors judges who distinguish each case 
from existing precedent and thereby foster complexity in the law. 
 Third, cases vary widely in their difficulty, but not in the 
Choi/Gulati rankings. In the tournament, a judge who resolves many 
small cases presenting simple issues in short opinions will rank 
higher than a judge who resolves a few large cases presenting com-
plex issues in long opinions. In reality, the latter judge may have ex-
erted greater effort and possess superior judicial talents. Fourth, 
even if the Choi/Gulati metric reflected pure productivity, intra- and 
intercircuit comparisons are a troublesome complication. In this 
measure, a judge who publishes more opinions than the average 
judge on his court and who sits in a circuit where the average num-
ber of opinions published per judge is above that of other circuits will 
be ranked higher than a judge who publishes fewer opinions than the 
average judge on his court and who sits on a circuit where the aver-
age number of opinions published per judge is below that of other cir-
cuits. However, the middling cases are less clear-cut. Is a judge who 
publishes more opinions than the average judge on his court but who 
sits in a circuit where the average number of opinions published per 
judge was below the average of other circuits better or worse than a 
judge who publishes fewer opinions than the average judge on his 
court but who sits in a circuit where the average number of opinions 
published per judge was above the average of other circuits? It is not 
obvious whether an above-average judge on a below-average circuit is 
better than a below-average judge on an above-average circuit. With-
out justification, Professors Choi and Gulati favor the former. They 
state that “[a]ny differences among judges will, therefore, be deter-
mined solely by each judge’s standing relative to the other judges 
within her own circuit,”20 and their productivity measure thus favors 
judges who are stars on their circuits. If their measure applied to 
basketball, Scottie Pippin playing for the Portland Trail Blazers 
would fare better than Scottie Pippin playing for the Chicago Bulls. 
In their metric, the presence of other all-stars who raise the circuit’s 
average productivity make it harder for a star judge to shine. Nota-
bly, judges on the D.C. Circuit, widely considered an all-star circuit 
and the warm-up bench for the Supreme Court, fare poorly in the 
Choi/Gulati productivity metric.21  
                                                                                                                     
 20. Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking, supra note 2, at 46. 
 21. See id. at 76-77. 
2005]                         JUDGING THE TOURNAMENT 1061 
 
B.   Quality 
 Given their view of the current system of confirmation, Professors 
Choi and Gulati use a measure of quality that is inconsistent with 
their assumptions about judicial behavior. The tournament assumes 
that the number of citations an opinion receives from courts outside 
its circuit reflects its quality.22 Yet Professors Choi and Gulati believe 
that many nominees are advanced on the basis of ideology rather 
than merit.23 The tournament does not consider the possibility that 
the citations may themselves be objects of ideological manipulation 
rather than indications of the quality of the legal analysis.24 For cita-
tions to reflect solely quality, judges would have to shed their ideo-
logical leanings once they reach the bench. If judges did so, an ideo-
logical President would have no reliably ideological judges to nomi-
nate to the Court. Were it so, the problem of ideologically driven 
nominations would vanish, and the tournament itself would be un-
necessary.  
 Even if judges do not choose their citations on the basis of ideol-
ogy, Professors Choi and Gulati’s measure of quality may actually re-
flect other characteristics. They acknowledge that judges differ in the 
initial probability that their opinions are read.25 The notoriety a 
judge enjoyed before joining the bench, or enjoyed while on the bench 
but before the observation period of this study, carries over onto the 
study’s observation window. A lawyer known to legal commentators 
is more likely to have her opinions read once she takes to the bench, 
and hence she has a greater probability of having her opinions cited 
than does a judge whose prior legal career was relatively obscure. 
Professors Choi and Gulati claim that “it is precisely this [pre-
tournament] reputation for quality analysis (and the underlying abil-
ity behind such a reputation) that we hope to find in a Supreme 
Court nominee.”26 The criterion favors academics over practitioners 
because publishing more readily establishes reputations than does 
winning cases or structuring deals. This measure promotes, for ex-
ample, a Scalia, Ginsburg, or Breyer over a Powell, Blackmun, or 
Souter. Moreover, the labor force of the judiciary gives erstwhile (or 
part-time) legal academics on the bench a further advantage. Law 
clerks who draft opinions are typically recent graduates of law 
schools, where they studied the casebooks and commentaries of these 
                                                                                                                     
 22. See id. at 48-50. 
 23. See id. at 30-31. 
 24. A recent study purports to find strong evidence of ideological voting in three-judge 
appellate panels. See Cass R. Sunstein et al., Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Ap-
peals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301 (2004).  
 25. See Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking, supra note 2, at 49. “Our methodology 
does not control for such pretournament inherent differences.” Id. 
 26. Id. 
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judges qua academics. Having previously relied on the instruction of 
these professors’ writings, law clerks are likely to look to the opinions 
of these familiar oracles for guidance. Furthermore, a judge’s opin-
ions may receive attention for reasons unrelated to his or her reputa-
tion for quality. The events that generate interest in a judge’s opin-
ions may or may not stem from the trenchancy of his legal reasoning 
on the bench.27 
 The tournament’s quality measure may also reflect speed in ren-
dering a decision on a common question faced by all circuits. Witness 
the recent flurry of opinions following the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Blakely v. Washington.28 The Blakely court held that the criminal 
sentencing guidelines of Washington State violated the Sixth 
Amendment because they did not require that every fact raising a 
sentence beyond the statutory maximum be proven to a jury beyond 
a reasonable doubt or admitted to by the defendant.29 Immediately, 
commentators and litigants wondered if the logic of Blakely would 
apply to the federal sentencing guidelines. Twelve days after the Su-
preme Court issued Blakely, the Seventh Circuit heard oral argu-
ment in United States v. Booker,30 and three days later, the court is-
sued a decision. The majority in Booker held that Blakely implied 
that sentence enhancements under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 
based on facts not determined by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt 
violated the Sixth Amendment.31 Twelve days after Booker, the Ninth 
Circuit decided United States v. Ameline,32 in which the majority 
largely agreed with the Seventh Circuit: “We join the Seventh Circuit 
in holding that there is no principled distinction between the Wash-
ington Sentencing Reform Act at issue in Blakely and the United 
States Sentencing Guidelines.”33  
 In the six weeks following the respective decisions, courts in other 
circuits cited Booker twenty-eight times but cited Ameline only thir-
teen times. Despite a time lag of less than two weeks, the earlier de-
cision was cited twice as many times. The advantage in terms of sub-
sequent citations to the first court to resolve an issue is significant. 
Each circuit court looks to its sister circuits in confronting legal is-
sues, in part because another circuit’s analysis may offer guidance. 
                                                                                                                     
 27. See, e.g., Article III Groupie, Judicial Divas and Hotties, UNDERNEATH THEIR 
ROBES: NEWS, GOSSIP, AND COLORFUL COMMENTARY ABOUT THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (Nov. 1, 
2004), at http://underneaththeirrobes.blogs.com/main/judicial_divas_and_hotties/index.html 
(treating Article III judges as celebrities). 
 28. 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). 
 29. See id. at 2537-38. 
 30. 375 F.3d 508 (7th Cir. 2004), aff’d and remanded by 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).  
 31. See id. at 510, 513, 515. 
 32. 376 F.3d 967 (9th Cir. 2004), amended and superseded on reh’g, 400 F.3d 646 (9th 
Cir. 2005), reh’g en banc granted, 401 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 33. Id. at 974 (footnote omitted). 
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In addition, a decision that conflicts, rather than conforms, with that 
of another circuit is more likely to be called en banc or to prompt a 
certiorari grant. The first circuit to weigh in on a legal issue is there-
fore more likely to be cited than subsequent circuits that agree with 
its conclusion. The tournament’s quality measure may reflect this 
first-mover advantage rather than which opinion contains the most 
thorough analysis.  
 The first answer is not necessarily the right one. Substantively, 
the circuits split on Blakely’s relevance to the federal guidelines, and 
after granting certiorari in United States v. Booker, the Supreme 
Court recently resolved the split.34 The legal community viewed sev-
eral aspects of the Court’s holding as a “surprise,” namely, the con-
clusions that judges must consult with the guidelines but that they 
are only advisory, and that sentences are subject to reasonableness 
review on appeal. Neither the author of the Seventh Circuit Booker 
majority (Judge Posner) nor its dissenter (Judge Easterbrook) nor 
any other appellate judge chose the same remedy as the Supreme 
Court did. The failure of any circuit judge to anticipate the Supreme 
Court’s holding during the few months between the Blakely decision 
and the grant of certiorari in Booker illustrates that fast analysis is 
not always the same as the Supreme Court’s analysis. 
 Another consideration is that opinions with clever turns of phrase 
are cited more often. A well-known rule of appellate practice is that 
an appellant’s brief must contain the argument with the “appellant’s 
contentions” and the reasons for them, with citations to the authori-
ties and parts of the record on which the appellant relies.35 One pur-
pose of this rule is to economize on judicial resources by sparing 
judges the task of searching for litigant’s arguments. In United 
States v. Dunkel,36 the Seventh Circuit vividly expressed this rule: 
“Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.”37 We 
found thirteen instances in which other circuit courts quoted this line 
in published opinions.38 We located another two unpublished opinions 
                                                                                                                     
 34. 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). 
 35. FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(9)(A). 
 36. 927 F.2d 955 (7th Cir. 1991) (per curiam). 
 37. Id. at 956. 
 38. See Crossley v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 355 F.3d 1112, 1114 (8th Cir. 2004); Ma-
lacara v. Garber, 353 F.3d 393, 405 (5th Cir. 2003); Coggin v. Longview Indep. Sch. Dist., 
337 F.3d 459, 468-69 (5th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (Jones, J., dissenting) (noting “[t]he problem 
has been colorfully, if hyperbolically, described by our brethren on the Seventh Circuit”); 
Indep. Towers of Wash. v. Washington, 350 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 2003); Roska ex rel. 
Roska v. Peterson, 328 F.3d 1230, 1246 n.13 (10th Cir. 2003); Craven v. Univ. of Colo. 
Hosp. Auth., 260 F.3d 1218, 1226 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Stuckey, 255 F.3d 528, 
531 (8th Cir. 2001); Downs v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003, 1007 n.1 (9th Cir. 
2000) (paraphrasing); Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1546 (10th Cir. 1995); 
Teague v. Bakker, 35 F.3d 978, 985 n.5 (4th Cir. 1994); Enplanar, Inc. v. Marsh, 11 F.3d 
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in other circuits that cite Dunkel for the proposition that cursory al-
legations are inadequate but do not quote the pigs-and-truffles lan-
guage directly.39 An earlier case in the Seventh Circuit made the 
same point: Rule 28 implies that appellate courts are not responsible 
for scouring briefs and accompanying documents for poorly articu-
lated and supported arguments. However, it expressed the point less 
colorfully, and other circuit courts have not cited it for this proposi-
tion. In United States v. Williams, a criminal defendant appealed his 
conviction in part on the ground that the trial court improperly ex-
cluded hearsay testimony, but the appellant failed to identify the 
portions of testimony he sought to have admitted at trial.40 The court 
held that the appellant’s conclusory allegation did not comply with 
Rule 28 and was therefore waived.41 It also noted, as it did in Dunkel 
but in less memorable language, that the court (and the prosecutor) 
are not responsible for locating the portions of the record relevant to 
the appellant’s claim: “Neither this court nor the United States At-
torney has a duty to comb the record in order to discover possible er-
rors.”42 We have found no published opinion in another circuit that 
cites this language or even cites Williams for this proposition. Clever 
turns of phrase can be helpful mnemonics or just plain amusing, but 
they do not necessarily indicate deeper legal reasoning. In fact, most 
legal writing texts instruct that workmanlike prose and the avoid-
ance of novel turns of phrase best achieve the clarity valued in legal 
analysis.43 Although writing ability and legal reasoning are surely 
complementary skills, judges’ appetite for the one-liners of their col-
leagues implies that a few zingers may distort the tournament’s 
measure of “quality.” 
                                                                                                                     
1284, 1297 n.16 (5th Cir. 1994); Greenwood v. FAA, 28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994); San-
jour v. EPA, 984 F.2d 434, 437 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
 39. See El-Fadl v. Cent. Bank of Jordan, 75 F.3d 668, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Larson v. 
Nutt, 34 F.3d 647, 648 (8th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). 
 40. 877 F.2d 516, 518 (7th Cir. 1989). 
 41. Id. at 518-19. 
 42. Id. at 519. 
 43. See BRYAN A. GARNER, THE ELEMENTS OF LEGAL STYLE 6-8 (2d ed. 2002) (empha-
sizing clarity); HENRY WEIHOFEN, LEGAL WRITING STYLE 61-82 (2d ed. 1980) (discussing 
the goal of simplicity). Although it is not generally recognized as a legal writing text, Dick-
ens’ David Copperfield is instructive on the matter:  
‘How do you like the law, Mr. Micawber?’ 
‘My dear Copperfield,’ he replied. ‘To a man possessed of the higher imaginative 
powers, the objection to legal studies is the amount of detail which they involve. 
Even in our professional correspondence,’ said Mr. Micawber, glancing at some 
letters he was writing, ‘the mind is not at liberty to soar to any exalted form of 
expression. Still, it is a great pursuit. A great pursuit!’ 
CHARLES DICKENS, DAVID COPPERFIELD 524-25 (Modern Library Paperback ed. 2000) 
(1850). 
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C.   Independence 
 Professors Choi and Gulati also attempt to measure whether a 
judge thinks independently rather than ideologically. They measure 
independence as the frequency with which a judge opposes a fellow 
panel member appointed by a President of the same political party, 
relative to the frequency with which the judge sits with judges of the 
same political party.44 The assumption of this measure is that an 
ideological judge is less likely to dissent from decisions joined by 
members of her own party, and an independent judge is as likely to 
dissent from a decision joined by members of her own party as she is 
to dissent from one joined by members of the other party. This model 
of judicial decisionmaking, that a judge’s political tendencies mirror 
those of her appointing President, is naturally an oversimplification. 
However, even if this assumption were generally valid, Professors 
Choi and Gulati’s measure misses an important dimension of inde-
pendence. Under their assumption, a judge’s independence from her 
appointing President could be measured in two ways: the frequency 
with which a judge dissents from members of her own party and the 
frequency with which she agrees with members of the opposing 
party. However, the tournament considers only the former and 
thereby risks mismeasurement. For example, a highly ideological 
judge who outflanked members of her own party on the ideological 
extreme might regularly dissent from decisions joined by members of 
her own party because she perceived them as too moderate. In so do-
ing, the highly ideological judge would appear highly independent in 
the tournament. By not considering the regularity with which the 
judge dissented from members of the opposing party, the tournament 
may fail to identify a judge who is persistently political.  
 This hypothetical might be criticized as too far-fetched, but it also 
points out the conceptual inconsistency in the tournament’s quality 
and independence measures. For the quality measure to reflect the 
superiority of legal reasoning and analysis, judges must cite opinions 
on the basis of their objective worth, independent of their politics. 
For the tournament’s independence measure to reflect autonomous 
thinking, judges must be predictably political in deciding cases. The 
models of judicial behavior underlying the two measures are in ten-
sion with one another. 
 The tournament’s independence measure fails to account for other 
complexities of judicial behavior. A judge who thinks independently 
might be more willing to compromise and may dissent relatively in-
frequently. For that judge, a small change in the number of her dis-
sents would greatly influence how she performed along this measure. 
                                                                                                                     
 44. See Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking, supra note 2, at 61-67. 
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Similarly, judges who stave off writing dissents by persuading their 
peers of their own view may be highly independent thinkers, but 
they would not appear so in this measure. In addition, a judge sitting 
in a circuit that consistently renders the legally “correct” decision 
could excel in this measure only by producing dissents of question-
able value.  
D.   Other Dimensions 
 The tournament is hampered by its exclusion of certain character-
istics conventionally thought to be important in judges and Justices. 
A judge may contribute mightily to the quality of an opinion even if 
she is not its author. A thoughtful judge may ask penetrating ques-
tions from the bench that help shape the views of the other members 
of the panel. In conference discussions or in commenting on a col-
league’s draft opinion, a judge may influence an opinion’s analysis. In 
circuits with frequent en banc rehearings, a judge may spend signifi-
cant energy reviewing the court’s decisions and writing to inform her 
colleagues of the desirability of rehearing particular cases en banc, 
but the public is never informed of these efforts. These characteris-
tics and efforts are reflected only obliquely in the tournament to the 
extent that they correlate with the three dimensions measured.  
 To a good degree, however, all of these criticisms are snipping 
around the edges of the Choi/Gulati tournament. What is remarkable 
about their exercise is the dominance of Judges Posner and Easter-
brook along the productivity and quality measures, and the bunching 
together of virtually everyone else. Although the Seventh Circuit duo 
measures up less well in the independence metric, persons who are 
at all familiar with their writings—from on or off the bench—would 
not question the independence of their thinking. Their performance 
in this category may itself indicate that the quality of independence 
is extremely difficult to quantify. Their dominance also raises the 
question of why the tournament is necessary at all. Everyone in the 
legal community knows that these two judges are the rarest of tal-
ents. The question that Choi and Gulati do not ask is why these two 
do not belong to the so-called “Bush Five,” the rumored short-list of 
potential nominees. The fact that they are not on the rumored list 
suggests that the tournament fails to capture some relevant phe-
nomenon. 
 In their writings off the bench, Judges Posner and Easterbrook 
have at times been intellectual provocateurs. For example, Judge 
Easterbrook has criticized mandatory disclosure rules in the federal 
securities laws45 and has characterized—not disapprovingly—the 
                                                                                                                     
 45. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Pro-
tection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 714 (1984) (“We have not constructed a compelling 
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rules of criminal procedure as creating a marketplace.46 Judge Posner 
has explored the possible benefits of baby-selling47 and licenses to 
commit rape,48 to name just two examples. These academic writings 
are noteworthy, even classic, pieces of legal scholarship because they 
rigorously analyze why the improbable could be possible. A penchant 
for provocation, sometimes at the expense of an audience’s sensibili-
ties, makes for interesting reading, classroom discussion, and aca-
demic symposia, but it might not be a desirable characteristic in a 
Supreme Court Justice.  
 The public might prefer its judges and Justices to possess numer-
ous other characteristics that the tournament excludes. For example, 
the public might want its judges to be fair, genuinely concerned 
about the parties coming before the court, and humbled by the au-
thority entrusted to them.49 These qualities—often lumped together 
under the rubric “judicial temperament”—do not readily lend them-
selves to quantification. The tournament’s best performers, as well as 
its worst ones, might have these characteristics in abundance, or 
they may have them in varying quantities. Because the tournament 
does not include them, the reader simply does not know. 
 The bunching together of other judges and the observation that 
small changes in the number of opinions, citations, or dissents sig-
nificantly reorder the rankings suggest that the tournament lacks 
something else. Specifically, it does not contain a measure that per-
mits most judges to be distinguished from one another.50 This ab-
sence may be an inadequacy of the tournament or it may reflect the 
technology of judging. Perhaps most appellate judges perform at 
roughly the same level because they face the same technology, pos-
sess the same staff resources, and, within a certain range, are armed 
with the same amount of intellectual firepower. Perhaps the most 
important similarity in the work of federal judges is that all of them 
labor with and under the same body of law: the Constitution, federal 
statutes and regulations, and precedent of the Supreme Court and 
the respective circuit courts.  
 The appropriate interpretation of the tournament’s main result—
that, with few exceptions, most federal judges perform roughly 
                                                                                                                     
case for [securities] regulation of any sort, let alone for the particular regulations the SEC 
uses.”). 
 46. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 289 (1983).  
 47. See Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby Short-
age, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1978). 
 48. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 7.1, at 216-17 (6th ed. 2003). 
 49. See, e.g., Brett Scharffs, The Role of Humility in Exercising Practical Wisdom, 32 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 127 (1998). 
 50. See Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking, supra note 2, at 75 (“Without Judge Pos-
ner or Judge Easterbrook, no one winner emerges.”). 
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equally—is unclear. Professors Choi and Gulati chose to emphasize a 
few judges at the top of the ranking rather than the ranking’s inabil-
ity to distinguish most of the judges. The primary lesson of the tour-
nament might instead be that since one federal judge is about as 
good as another along the dimensions they measure, the few outliers 
in the tournament are effectively statistical noise. If so, this interpre-
tation would argue in favor of replacing the current nomination proc-
ess with a randomization device in which a Supreme Court nominee 
was chosen by lot from the pool of federal appellate judges. A ran-
domization process would achieve their goal of reducing partisan 
bickering. Curiously, Professors Choi and Gulati did not consider this 
alternative.  
 Ultimately, the exclusion from the tournament of relevant charac-
teristics imparts some measurement error to the prediction of the 
judge most qualified to sit on the Supreme Court. This inaccuracy 
implies that a nomination of a judge other than the tournament win-
ner to the Supreme Court may not, as Professors Choi and Gulati 
contend, be solely a function of ideology.  
II.   WHAT HAPPENS WHEN JUDGES “JUDGE TO THE TOURNAMENT?” 
 Professors Choi and Gulati emphasize that the tournament meas-
ures a judge’s productivity or work effort.51 By calling their rankings 
a tournament, they reference an economics literature in which hier-
archical reward structures induce greater effort from workers.52 The 
suggestion that appellate judges need competition implies that the 
current system is not operating optimally. But the idea that appel-
late judges exert insufficient amounts of effort contrasts with the 
prevailing wisdom that the federal appellate bench is understaffed. 
Since 1960, the number of cases filed in federal appellate courts rose 
by more than fifteenfold, but the number of judges increased by only 
2.5 times.53 As a result, the average active judge handles 956 more 
cases per year than she did forty years ago.54 Although caseload var-
                                                                                                                     
 51. See Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking, supra note 2, at 43 (describing published 
opinions as requiring more effort than unpublished ones); id. at 62 (emphasizing the effort 
required to write dissents and concurrences). 
 52. See Sherwin Rosen, Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments, 76 AM. 
ECON. REV. 701, 709 (1986) (explaining that prizes in a sequential elimination tournament 
must be concentrated at the top in order to induce sufficient effort in later rounds); cf. Ed-
ward P. Lazear & Sherwin Rosen, Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts, 
89 J. POL. ECON. 841, 849 (1981) (suggesting that a tournament induces optimal invest-
ment in skills). 
 53. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL FACTS AND FIGURES: MULTI-YEAR 
STATISTICAL COMPILATIONS OF FEDERAL COURT CASELOAD THROUGH FISCAL YEAR 2004, at 
tbl.1.3 (2005), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/table1.03.pdf. 
 54. See id. 
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ies considerably across circuits, it has risen in all circuits. The crush 
of cases already provides judges ample incentive to work hard.  
 Competition among circuit judges is a curious virtue to extol. If 
the overall effort of appellate judges is not in question, then the need 
for competition suggests that the distribution of judicial resources 
has been misallocated and that the tournament would redirect judi-
cial resources in the right direction. It is here that we have our 
greatest differences with Choi and Gulati’s proposal. It is precisely 
because the tournament’s qualifying criteria are known to each judge 
that there is a possibility of competition. We may fairly ask: Do we 
really wish to foster competition along the productivity, quality, and 
independence measures? Are there perverse consequences to the 
competition? What happens when judges “judge to the tournament”? 
 The structure of the federal appellate courts appears designed to 
discourage competition among judges. In contrast to the separated 
branches, which face “hydraulic pressure . . . to exceed the outer lim-
its of [their] power,”55 within the judicial branch appellate courts are 
collegial, not competitive, bodies. Circuit courts have a near monop-
oly over federal cases and controversies within their jurisdiction, lim-
ited only by the Supreme Court’s decisions on those questions. Colle-
gial decisionmaking not only encourages but demands collusion (in 
the economic sense) among judges. The terms of employment for fed-
eral judges discourage their thinking about possible promotion to the 
Supreme Court. Federal appellate judges are not even guaranteed 
consideration for a nomination because the President may look be-
yond the federal bench for good candidates. Perhaps most important, 
Article III of the Constitution grants each judge a lifetime appoint-
ment, conditional on good behavior.56 Life tenure spares a judge the 
temptation to tailor her decisions to retain her current position or to 
angle for the next one. Professors Choi and Gulati would undo this 
system and have judges altering their decisions to jockey for an ap-
pointment to the Court. 
 The first “competitive” consequence of the tournament would be 
analogous to the “school-qualifying-exam” effect. Exam-based promo-
tion systems in secondary schools have as their goal that students 
demonstrate minimal competency. Critics contend, however, that the 
tests create an incentive for educators to maximize passage rates by 
                                                                                                                     
 55. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983). 
 56. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. Life tenure in a single position contrasts with the usual 
economic rationale for a tournament. Often an actor’s skills are unknown, and a sequen-
tial-elimination tournament provides a cost-effective mechanism for players to determine if 
they possess the skills necessary to succeed in the endeavor. If they do not, they may 
quickly exit and seek other pursuits. See Lazear & Rosen, supra note 52, at 861 (suggest-
ing “tryouts” when ability is unknown); Glenn M. MacDonald, The Economics of Rising 
Stars, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 155 (1988). 
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ignoring any subject not examined. Similarly, ambitious judges 
might ignore any activities and abandon any qualities that do not 
advance their rankings in at least one of the three dimensions of the 
tournament. For the reasons previously described, this single-
mindedness would not serve the public well. Second, even if judges 
limited their attention to just the criteria of the tournament, they 
might still modify their decisionmaking in ways that do not further 
the rule of law or the quality of justice. Perhaps the easiest dimen-
sion to manipulate is the productivity ranking. A judge’s relative po-
sition improves by designating more decisions for publication. A 
judge need not actually improve the quality of the decision in order to 
advance in the tournament’s productivity ranking. Unlike law pro-
fessors who must persuade journal editors that their writings are 
worth publishing, Federal Reporter, Third Series, is a circuit judge’s 
Frostian home: when judges go there, West Publishing has to take 
them in. A counterargument may be that a judge’s concern with the 
quality of her opinions, as measured either by the tournament or by 
her reputation in the legal community, constrains her willingness to 
publish everything. This argument has some merit, but it falls short 
in three ways.  
 First, a recent proposed change in the Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure (F.R.A.P.) has prompted circuits with relatively large un-
published opinion practices to consider how they would respond if 
every decision were treated as a published decision, that is, as prece-
dent that can be cited to the court.57 The conventional wisdom is that 
if proposed F.R.A.P. 32.1 were adopted, then a decision, which previ-
ously would have contained some analysis and explanation of the de-
cision for the benefit of the parties, will instead issue as a summary 
affirmance or reversal, albeit a published one. The tournament re-
doubles the incentive for summary decisions. Because the tourna-
ment counts only published opinions without reference to their con-
tent, summary decisions boost a judge’s productivity ranking even 
though they require less effort than the types of unpublished deci-
sions issued currently.  
 Second, the quality rankings interact with the incentive to publish 
in odd ways. Citation counts encourage judges to distinguish prior 
precedents, even to author conflicting opinions, since such opinions 
will likely be acknowledged by other courts. Take our prior example 
of the Seventh Circuit’s Booker decision. A court is more likely to cite 
Booker itself than a subsequent opinion that agrees with Booker and 
                                                                                                                     
 57. One of us has publicly commented on the proposed change, opposing it. Letter 
from Jay S. Bybee, Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, to Peter G. McCabe, 
Secretary, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (Feb. 10, 2004), available at 
http://www.secretjustice.org/pdf_files/Comments/03-AP-327.pdf. 
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adopts its approach. However, an opinion that disagrees with Booker 
or that adds a nuance to its analysis is more worthy of citation. An 
ambitious judge in another circuit would therefore have an incentive 
to depart in some way from Booker, even if she agreed with its rea-
soning and conclusion. By relying on citation counts, the tournament 
rewards judges for the novelty of their opinions; the result may be 
less clarity or certainty in the law. 
 Third, one version of the quality rankings counts just the citations 
to a judge’s “top twenty” opinions.58 This scheme strengthens the in-
centive to issue summary judgments in cases that do not present 
novel or interesting questions. An ambitious judge could summarily 
decide the bulk of cases and focus her attention on crafting a few 
spectacular opinions. In so doing, she would boost her tally of pub-
lished opinions and jumpstart her quality ranking. The quality rank-
ings create incentives for other strategic behaviors. As described 
above, the tournament’s quality measure spurs pithy statements and 
judicial aphorisms. This reward structure is at some tension with the 
actual quality of legal analysis. In the political sphere, one-liner 
characterizations of a candidate’s positions are much decried. The 
tournament rewards the proliferation of this practice in judicial writ-
ing, where more thoughtful analysis should prevail. Furthermore, a 
self-interested judge might collude with other judges to boost her ci-
tations. Senior judges who visit other circuits have an opportunity to 
cite their home-circuit peers in the opinions they author in the vis-
ited circuit. The tournament creates an incentive for a judge seeking 
to boost her quality score to engage in “trades” with a senior judge in 
exchange for out-of-circuit citations. 
 Even if a judge cannot increase her own quality rankings, she can 
suppress those of her rivals in other circuits. The transparency of the 
criteria imply that a judge knows precisely the identity of the other 
judges clustered around her and, thus, whose opinions to avoid cit-
ing. The tournament creates an incentive for judges to do the oppo-
site of what Professors Choi and Gulati believe makes their quality 
measure plausible: to cite opinions for strategic reasons rather than 
for the quality of the legal reasoning and analysis. The tournament 
itself corrodes the validity of this measure. 
 The tournament’s independence ranking may have the most pre-
dictable incentive effect. To stand out in this measure, a judge should 
simply dissent more often when she sits with judges of the same po-
litical party. Additional dissents and concurrences breed confusion 
and complexity in the law. The American courts have a tradition of 
fostering collegial opinions. Among Chief Justice Marshall’s greatest 
contributions to the Supreme Court was his leadership in effecting 
                                                                                                                     
 58. See Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking, supra note 2, at 54-58. 
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its departure from the English practice of seriatim opinion writing.59 
The tournament erodes this tradition. A greater agreement among 
the panel indicates the judiciary’s solidarity in the basis of its judg-
ment. We recognize this when we debate the viability of 5-4 decisions 
of the Court, and we acknowledge the unassailability of a unanimous 
judgment and a single opinion. Perhaps the strongest signal of soli-
darity that a court can communicate is the unanimous and unsigned 
per curiam opinion. The tournament weakens the willingness of 
judges to join a per curiam because doing so forgoes an opportunity 
to appear independent. It also weakens the incentive to draft a per 
curiam because it denies the author an additional point in the pro-
ductivity rankings. 
 Our criticism of the tournament should not be mistaken for mere 
cynicism. By suggesting that judges might engage in strategic behav-
ior in response to the tournament, we do not impugn the integrity of 
the American bench. Our criticism is directed to the criteria for win-
ning the tournament, which, Professors Choi and Gulati tell us, are 
conspicuously “transparent”60 precisely so that judges will know what 
they have to do to win, and “gaming is a good thing.”61 What we see 
as an objection—that judges will compete in the tournament—
Professors Choi and Gulati see as the tournament’s virtue. However, 
as we have described, the tournament creates incentives for a 
gamesmanship that does not reflect desirable qualities in a judge or 
Justice, and therefore a whole new set of additional rules might have 
to be introduced to ensure the tournament actually represents the 
“fair play” that its creators envision. 
 The establishment of the tournament as a selection device for Su-
preme Court nominees also changes the incentives facing the Presi-
dent. Professors Choi and Gulati intend the tournament to motivate 
the President to pick its winner.62 However, the greater the import of 
the tournament, the greater the temptation to pick a candidate from 
outside the federal appellate bench. Sidestepping the tournament al-
together is the same maneuver that some Presidents have purport-
edly taken to eschew scrutiny of a nominee’s views on hot-button is-
sues. As previously described, a judicial opinion on a hot-button issue 
may provide insights into a nominee’s ability. A candidate who has 
not written on these issues is more difficult to evaluate, and hence to 
oppose, because relatively less is known about her. Similarly, a can-
didate who is unranked in the tournament cannot be compared to the 
                                                                                                                     
 59. See R. KENT NEWMYER, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE HEROIC AGE OF THE SUPREME 
COURT 157 (2001); G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE 
1815-1835, at 191 & n.145 (1991). 
 60. Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking, supra note 2, at 36. 
 61. Id. at 34. 
 62. See id. at 27-28. 
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set of alternative candidates. By picking a nominee who is not 
ranked in the tournament, a President could avoid precisely the scru-
tiny that the tournament is intended to apply. Rather than expand-
ing the amount of information available about nominees, the tour-
nament encourages the selection of “stealth” candidates or candi-
dates without paper trails.  
 The tournament also alters the public’s incentives. The ranking of 
judges creates a new set of data easily grasped by the public. A 
President who nominates number forty-two on the list will have to 
explain himself.63 And even if the top ten on the list are not feasible 
candidates for one reason or another, the President will still have to 
explain why judges ranked eleven through forty-one are not available 
for nomination. In contrast, he will not have to explain why he did 
not nominate the judge ranked forty-third because the reason will be 
obvious to everyone. That is a heavy responsibility to place on a 
ranking. Additionally, the content-free nature of the tournament 
makes it easier for the public to have an “informed” opinion about a 
nominee’s fitness for the Court without acquiring information about 
the nominee’s judicial philosophy. Like baseball fans who read box 
scores and participate in rotisserie leagues but never watch any 
games, students of the tournament may vigorously debate a nomi-
nee’s worth without reading a single opinion. The tournament would 
make it less, not more, likely that discussions of the desirability of a 
particular nominee would be based on a review of the judge’s actual 
work product. 
III.   SHOULDN’T WE COMPARE APPLES TO APPLES AND ORANGES TO 
ORANGES? 
 As other contributors to this Symposium have observed, the quali-
ties that allow a judge to excel on a circuit court are not necessarily 
those that engender success on the Supreme Court. It is not self-
evident why productivity on the courts of appeals, citation count, and 
independence are the qualities we most need in a future Supreme 
Court Justice. Just to take one example, productivity may be a proxy 
for diligence, and we can agree that we generally want diligent Jus-
tices, but the Supreme Court’s docket has been shrinking over the 
past years from an average of about 170 cases to roughly ninety-five 
cases per year.64 Is the productivity measure an effort to boost flag-
                                                                                                                     
 63. See id. at 28. 
 64. Mark Tushnet, Foreword: The New Constitutional Order and the Chastening of 
Constitutional Aspiration, 113 HARV. L. REV. 29, 68 (1999) (“At its peak, the Court heard 
argument in about 170 cases per Term, whereas during the past five years it has heard ar-
gument in fewer than one hundred cases each year.”); see also Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 
1155, 1177 n.34, 1178 n.37 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that in the 1999 Term, the United States 
Supreme Court heard seventy-seven cases, or less than nine majority opinions per Justice, 
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ging productivity of the Court? Or should the public regard a Su-
preme Court appointment as a well-earned retirement after hard 
work on the circuit? 
 Professors Choi and Gulati have exhaustively studied which apple 
is best on the assumption that it will make the best orange. The win-
ner of the tournament has himself acknowledged the possibility that 
greatness as a circuit judge does not necessarily assure greatness as 
a Justice.65 This observation is not just a criticism of the tournament 
but instead a suggestion for another use to which it might be put. 
Rather than using the measure to predict which appellate court 
judge would make the best Supreme Court Justice, the Choi/Gulati 
metric might be useful in identifying whom should be nominated to 
the circuit courts in the future. 
 If a consensus existed that the tournament accurately measured 
the desired characteristics of circuit judges—a strong assumption—
then it might be used to identify the traits that impart success to cir-
cuit judges. Why are the judges that succeed in the tournament so 
much better than the rest of the pack? Academics have studied and 
debated the relationship between a judge’s personal characteristics 
and the outcomes of particular types of cases.66 A similar exercise 
might be undertaken with the tournament. A judge’s score in the 
tournament might be related to her individual characteristics. Such a 
study might reveal that the best judges are lapsed academics, erst-
while appellate practitioners, or former district judges. Or, perhaps 
only a former editor-in-chief of her law school’s law review thrives on 
the bench. If so, such information would help the President and Sen-
ate identify and evaluate candidates for the appellate bench. 
Whether such a study would reveal a short set of qualities that as-
sure success on the appellate bench is uncertain. Moreover, it is not 
clear that we want a bench comprised of judges satisfying a narrow 
judicial “profile.” We have more democratic tradition in this regard 
than other countries whose judges rise through the civil service and 
undergo rigorous, uniform training. Democracy can be unruly, and as 
evidenced by our history, we have long assumed that the judiciary’s 
membership should reflect a variety of life experiences. However, 
                                                                                                                     
while Ninth Circuit judges during 1999 heard an average of 450 cases, averaging twenty 
majority opinions and 130 unpublished dispositions). 
 65. Howard Bashman, 20 Questions for Circuit Judge Richard A. Posner of the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, HOW APPEALING (Dec. 1, 2003), at 
http://legalaffairs.org/howappealing/20q/2003_12_01_20q-appellateblog_archive.html 
#107025481874565902 (“I also note that judges who do well on lower courts sometimes 
disappoint as Supreme Court Justices.”). 
 66. For two of the more systematic studies, see Gregory C. Sisk et al., Charting the In-
fluences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1377 (1998); and Gregory C. Sisk et al., Searching for the Soul of Judicial Decision-
making: An Empirical Study of Religious Freedom Decisions, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 491 (2004). 
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such a study would at least compare apples to apples, rather than 
apples to oranges. 
 If interest instead lies in what makes a successful Supreme Court 
Justice, the appropriate subjects of study are the Justices them-
selves. The task of measuring performance of Justices on the Su-
preme Court is no small feat, as other contributors to this Sympo-
sium have discussed.67 If a measure of a Justice’s success on the 
Court existed, however, it could be related to his or her characteris-
tics in a fashion similar to that described for circuit judges above. 
The results of the studies of circuit judges and Supreme Court Jus-
tices could be compared to determine whether the individual charac-
teristics that bred success in one position did so in the other. Al-
though this proposal is a wholly different research enterprise than 
Professors Choi and Gulati’s, it would test directly their strong as-
sumption that traits that make for a good circuit judge also make for 
a good Justice. It would force us to rethink the criteria: Do we believe 
that productivity, citation counts, and independence are the hall-
marks of the great Justices? How do the great Justices fare in a 
“Tournament of Justices?”68 
 The failure to test the key assumption of their model illustrates 
that the tournament, although it involves measurement, is not really 
social science. Ordinal rankings, like David Letterman’s Top Ten 
lists, or numerical measurements, like baseball batting averages, are 
mere quantification. For the reasons described previously in this Es-
say, whether the tournament—despite its elaborateness—actually 
captures the phenomenon it purports to is uncertain. The use of a 
measurement whose validity is untested imposes three costs. First, 
as previously discussed, the measure may distort the incentives of 
the subjects who know that they are evaluated according to this met-
ric. Second, judges who rank low in the tournament because of its 
imprecision are unfairly besmirched. Professors Choi and Gulati pull 
their punches by claiming that they cannot infer anything about the 
low-ranking judges.69 If so, then perhaps only top finishers in the 
tournament should be announced. Third, the tournament also harms 
the public. Should litigants who appear before lower-ranking judges 
                                                                                                                     
 67. See, e.g., Lee Epstein et al., The Role of Qualifications in the Confirmation of 
Nominees to the U.S. Supreme Court, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1145 (2005); Daniel A. Farber, 
Supreme Court Selection and Measures of Past Judicial Performance, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 1175 (2005); Richard A. Posner, Judicial Behavior and Performance: An Economic 
Approach, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1259 (2005); David C. Vladeck, Keeping Score: The Utility 
of Empirical Measurements in Judicial Selection, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1415 (2005). 
 68. We know of some Justices who, by any measure of productivity, will not do well. 
See David P. Currie, The Most Insignificant Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry, 50 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 466 (1983); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Most Insignificant Justice: Further Evidence, 
50 U. CHI. L. REV. 481 (1983). 
 69. See Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking, supra note 2, at 75-77. 
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conclude that they have received an inferior brand of justice? If Pro-
fessors Choi and Gulati believe their tournament accurately meas-
ures the adequacy of judicial performance, are they suggesting that 
litigants appearing before lower-ranking judges did not receive due 
process? 
IV.   CONCLUSION 
 In complex human endeavors, attempts to quantify the dimen-
sions of success are inherently appealing. Sports fans who keep game 
statistics are a prime example. But what makes rankings so enjoy-
able to discuss and analyze is that at some level fans know that the 
numbers never measure all the aspects of an athlete’s play. Some in-
tangible residual is left out, and this left-out portion might be the 
most important feature of an athlete’s play. In judging, where out-
comes are even less readily observed than sports, the gap between 
numerical measures and actual performance is greater. Professors 
Choi and Gulati’s attempt at measurement is a valiant one, but to 
some extent, they have told us what we already knew: Judges Posner 
and Easterbrook are exceptional talents, and the rest of the appellate 
bench is hard to distinguish from one another. Their measures are 
imprecise ones, and were judges to compete along these dimensions, 
society might bear considerable costs. Studies that expand our 
knowledge of the work of the judiciary deserve applause, but Profes-
sors Choi and Gulati have not yet presented a convincing case that 
choosing Supreme Court nominees by tournament should replace se-
lecting them by the Constitution’s more political process. 
 
